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Paranormal belief, thinking style preference and susceptibility  
to confirmatory conjunction errors  
 
Highlights  
1. stronger ESP, PK and afterlife believers made more conjunction errors (CEs)  
2. believers also made more confirmatory (verses disconfirmatory) CEs 
3. Individuals with low (versus high) NFC made marginally more confirmatory CEs 
4. intuitive-experiential thinking had no impact on CE rates 
5. findings are consistent with Tentori’s (2013) Confirmation-Theoretical Framework  
 
Abstract 
This study examines the extent to which belief in extrasensory perception (ESP), 
psychokinesis (PK) or life after death (LAD), plus need for cognition (NFC) and faith in 
intuition (FI), predict the generation of confirmatory conjunction errors. An opportunity 
sample (n=261) completed sixteen conjunction problems manipulated across a 2 event 
type (paranormal vs. non-paranormal)  2 outcome type (confirmatory vs. 
disconfirmatory) within subjects design. Three Generalised Linear Mixed Models - one 
per paranormal belief type - were performed. With respondent gender and age 
controlled for, ESP, PK and LAD beliefs were all associated with the making (vs. non-
making) of conjunction errors both generally and specifically for confirmatory 
conjunctive outcomes. Event type had no impact. Individuals high in NFC were less 
likely to commit the fallacy. The role thinking style plays in shaping paranormal 
believers’ susceptibility to confirmatory conjunction biases is discussed. 
Methodological issues and future research ideas are also considered. 
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1. Introduction 
Belief in non-theistic paranormal phenomena has been linked to various cognitive 
“deficits” including errors of probabilistic reasoning (Rogers, 2015; Wiseman & Watt, 2006; 
see also French & Stone, 2014; Irwin, 2009). One such error is the conjunction fallacy - the 
tendency to misjudge two independent yet co-occurring (‘conjunctive’) events as being more 
likely than either constituent event alone (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983)
1
 - with several studies 
                                                 
1
 In their original “Linda problem” Tversky and Kahneman (1983) describe the fictitious Linda as being “31 
years old, single, outspoken, and very bright, who majored in philosophy and who, as a student, had been deeply 
concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice and who had participated in antinuclear 
demonstrations”. Participants were asked to rank the likelihood of eight eventualities including that “Linda is an 
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suggesting paranormal believers make more conjunction errors (CEs) than non-believers 
(Brotherton & French, 2014; Dagnall, Drinkwater, Denovan, Parker & Rowley, 2016; Prike, 
Arnold & Williamson, 2017; Rogers, Davis, & Fisk, 2009; Rogers, Fisk & Wiltshire, 2011; 
Rogers, Fisk & Lowrie, 2016; 2017). However, significant paranormal belief  CE 
associations have not always been found (Dagnall, Denovan, Drinkwater, Parker, & Clough, 
2016; Dagnall, Drinkwater, Parker & Rowley, 2014; Dagnall, Parker & Munley, 2007) with 
some researchers claiming this is explained by believers’ broader tendency to misperceive 
randomness as measured by their judgment of, say, coin toss sequences (e.g. which of 
HHHHHH, HHHTTT or HTHHTT is most likely to occur) (e.g., Dagnall et al., 2014; 2017). 
Other researchers claim individual differences in believers’ preference for intuitive-
experiential over rational-analytic thinking offers at least a partial explanation for their 
heightened CE proneness (e.g., Prike et al., 2017). Another factor that seems relevant to 
believers’ fallacy proneness is whether the second constituent confirms or disconfirms the 
first (Rogers, Fisk & Lowrie, 2016). Relevant studies are now discussed.  
1.1. Paranormal Belief & Confirmatory Conjunction Errors 
In the aforementioned study, Rogers et al. (2016) examined the extent to which believers’ 
tendency to make CEs differed for confirmatory over disconfirmatory conjunctions, 
reasoning that because believers often present strong pro-paranormal confirmation biases 
(e.g., Russell & Jones, 1980; Wiseman, Greening & Smith, 2003), they would make more 
errors for paranormal confirming (belief-congruent) over paranormal disconfirming (belief-
                                                                                                                                                        
active feminist”, that “Linda is a bank teller” and that “Linda is a bank teller and an active feminist (italics 
added). The first two statements serve as constituent events with the latter the conjunctive term. Accordingly, a 
conjunction error is made whenever the conjunctive term is judged more likely than one or both constituent(s) 
alone. Tversky and Kahneman found over 80% of participants succumbed to the fallacy despite this being 
normatively impossible. Subsequent research confirms this is a robust effect (see Fisk, 2017). 
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incongruent) as well as non-paranormal (belief-neutral) conjunctions
2
. Sceptics, in contrast, 
would reject the paranormal premise and be less prone to paranormal confirming conjunctive 
biases. This argument drew on Tentori’s Confirmation-Theoretical Framework (CTF; 
Tentori, Crupi, & Russo, 2013) whereby CE generation is said to be shaped, not by 
constituent probability estimates (i.e. subjective judgements of each event’s individual 
likelihood) as originally proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1983), but instead by the 
degree to which background information increases the perceived credibility (i.e. “inductively 
confirms”) the second constituent. Several possibilities exist. If believers and non-believers 
perceive background evidence as being equally credible, they will be equally prone to making 
CEs for non-paranormal events regardless of outcome type
3
. Alternatively, if believers 
perceive background evidence as being more credible in general they will make more CEs for 
confirmatory over disconfirmatory CEs (relative to non-believers) regardless of event type. 
Findings from Rogers et al., (2009; 2011) suggest this is the case. Finally, if believers 
perceive background evidence as being more credible in relation to paranormal events only, 
they will make more CEs for paranormal confirming over paranormal disconfirming 
conjunctions.  
To formally test these ideas, Rogers and colleagues (2016) modified paranormal and non-
paranormal conjunctive scenarios originally employed in Rogers et al. (2011) such that now, 
the second constituent either confirmed or disconfirmed the first. For example, background 
evidence in the paranormal [non-paranormal] version of Rogers et al.’s (2016) revised 
“motorway” scenario read as follows: 
Erica is a 37 year old businesswoman who lives near Manchester. In her spare time Erica attends psychic 
awareness [car maintenance] classes where she is currently learning how to use precognition to ‘see into the 
                                                 
2
 In the present context, belief neutral conjunctions are those that have no obvious relevance to ostensibly 
paranormal phenomena. By comparison, belief incongruent conjunctions are those that actively disconfirm the 
veracity of alleged paranormal events. 
3
 By definition, non-believers should dismiss the credibility of any background evidence suggestive of a genuine 
paranormal event. 
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future’ [keep her car ‘safe and roadworthy’]. Erica has arranged to meet a new client in London some 250 
miles away. 
 
Respondents were then asked to rate the probability (“chances in 100”) that each of three 
statements - the two constituent events plus their conjunction - would occur. Here, the first 
constituent event [statement (a)] was identical in all four (2 event type x 2 outcome type) 
experimental conditions. The second constituent [statement (b)] - and by extension, the 
conjunctive term [statement (c)] - was manipulated to reflect one of two outcome types, such 
that it either confirmed or disconfirmed the first constituent event. For example, respondents 
who read the confirmatory version of the (revised) motorway case were asked to rate the 
likelihood that: 
(a) Erica feels uneasy driving her car for such a long distance. 
(b) Whilst on the motorway, Erica’s car breaks down. 
(c) Erica feels uneasy driving her car for such a long distance and 
whilst on the motorway, Erica’s car breaks down. 
 
Here, the first constituent describing Erica’s sense of uneasiness is confirmed by the second 
which depicts her car as breaking down on the motorway. Respondents who read the 
disconfirmatory version were instead asked to rate these three statements: 
(a) Erica feels uneasy driving her car for such a long distance. 
(b) Whilst on the motorway, Erica’s car works perfectly. 
(c) Erica feels uneasy driving her car for such a long distance and 
whilst on the motorway, Erica’s car works perfectly 
 
Here, the first constituent describing Erica’s sense of uneasiness is disconfirmed by the 
second which depicts her car as working perfectly and thus not breaking down. In all cases, a 
conjunction error was made whenever the conjunctive term [statement (c)] was deemed more 
likely than either or both the constituent event(s) alone (cf. Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). 
Rogers and colleagues (2016) found stronger paranormal believers made more CEs than 
weaker believers, with this the case regardless of whether events depicted an ostensibly 
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paranormal or a clearly non-paranormal event. This suggests stronger paranormal believers 
are more prone to context free conjunctive biases further supporting the generality of their 
fallacy proneness (Rogers et al., 2009; 2011).  
As hypothesised, stronger believers also made more CEs when the second constituent 
confirmed rather than disconfirmed the first, implying they were also more prone to a 
confirmatory conjunction fallacy. In contrast, believers’ propensity for confirmatory CEs did 
not differ across outcome type with believers making as many CEs for paranormal 
confirming as they did paranormal disconfirming conjunctions. In short, believers’ 
heightened fallacy proneness was not limited to pro-paranormal (belief congruent) 
conjunctions.  
Finally, trends were noticeably stronger for individuals with a more pronounced belief in 
extrasensory perception (ESP: b=.18; p=.001) and psychokinesis (PK: b=.19; p<.001) relative 
to those endorsing the veracity of life after death (LAD: b=.14; p=.069), with the latter only 
approaching significance
4
. This seems reasonable given conceptual differences in these 
constructs (Irwin & Watt, 2007) together with previous evidence that whilst ESP and PK 
endorsement is associated with flawed probabilistic reasoning LAD endorsement is more 
reflective of socio-cultural, religious, philosophical and/or motivational factors such as the 
need to believe in an afterlife (Rogers, 2015; Thalbourne, 1996). 
To summarize: findings from Rogers et al (2016) suggest individuals with a more 
pronounced paranormal belief - particularly in ESP and PK - are especially susceptible to a 
generic (context-free) and confirmatory - rather than just paranormal confirming - 
                                                 
4
 ESP is defined as the alleged ability to obtain information directly via means other than the known senses or 
logical inference. PK is the alleged ability to influence physical systems (e.g., objects, biological organisms) 
directly through mental processes. Finally, LAD reflects the notion that some disembodied aspect of human 
personality or consciousness survives bodily death. Often, the term “psi” - pronounced “sigh” - is used to denote 
the unknown paranormal element thought to underlie both ESP and PK (Irwin & Watt, 2007). It should be noted 
that Rogers et al. (2016) failed to report exp(b) coefficients for any predictor and additionally, did not perform 
analyses to directly compare b coefficients across the three paranormal belief types. As such, the extent to which 
ESP and PK beliefs are significantly stronger predictors of CE rates than LAD beliefs remains speculative. 
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conjunction fallacy. That said, CE rates across different types of paranormal belief have been 
inconsistent with Rogers et al.’s (2017) finding that only PK believers were especially prone 
to conjunctive biases. Given mixed findings, one aim of the current study is to re-examine the 
extent to which ESP, PK and LAD endorsement uniquely predict the generation of CEs, in 
particular confirmatory conjunction errors (Rogers et al., 2016). A second aim is to test the 
robustness of believers’ propensity for conjunction biases - overall as well as specifically for 
confirmatory conjunctions - once individual differences in thinking style preference have 
been controlled for. The relevant thinking styles literature is now discussed.  
1.2.  Thinking Style Preference 
According to dual processing theory judgments are made via two independent yet 
interacting information processing systems; intuitive-experiential or System 1 thinking which 
is spontaneous, effortless preconscious, holistic and emotion-orientated reflecting what feels 
right, plus analytic-rational or System 2 thinking, which is deliberate, effortful, conscious, 
specific and reason-orientated reflecting what is thought to be right (e.g., Epstein, 2013; 
Kahneman, 2011). Whilst both contribute to decision making, default responses tend to be 
heuristical and thus on the former unless subsequently over-ridden by the latter (Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013). 
As already implied, paranormal believers’ heightened CE proneness may be at least 
partially explained by individual differences in preferred thinking style (e.g., Prike et al., 
2017). First, numerous studies have linked adult paranormality to a heightened preference for 
intuitive-experiential thinking and/or a diminished preference for analytic-rational or 
reflective thinking (e.g., Bouvet & Bonnefo, 2015; Irwin, 2015; Irwin & Wilson, 2013; 
Lobato, Mendoza, Sims & Chin, 2014; Pennycook et al., 2015; Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, 
Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2012; Prike et al., 2017; see also French & Stone, 2014; Irwin, 2009). 
For instance, in their Belief-Unbelief Asymmetry model, Pennycook and colleagues (2012) 
Running Head: PARANORMAL BELIEF, THINKING STYLE & CONFIRMATORY CONJUNCTION ERRORS 
9 
argue that endorsement of paranormal (and religious) concepts is a default psychological state 
driven by evolutionarily adaptive heuristical processes. Consequently, individuals 
predisposed to a more analytic style of thinking are less likely to endorse paranormal 
concepts not because they are less intuitive per se but instead because they are more inclined 
to scrutinize then override (“un-believe”) any pro-paranormal intuitions they have. 
Individuals predisposed to a more intuitive thinking style tend to engage less, if at all, in such 
scrutiny.  
However, the relationship between preferred thinking style and adult paranormality has 
not always been straightforward with a number of studies finding higher levels of both 
analytic-rational and intuitive-experiential thinking were associated with a more pronounced 
paranormal worldview (e.g., Majima, 2015; Wolfradt, Oubaid, Straube, Bischoff & Mischo, 
1999) with others finding no thinking style  paranormal belief association (e.g., Gray & 
Gallo, 2016). Nevertheless, most work suggests adoption of intuitive-experiential (System 1) 
thinking is a significant factor in shaping adults’ paranormal worldview (French & Stone, 
2014).  
Second, individual differences in the propensity to override intuitive with reflective 
thinking exist (e.g., De Neys & Bonnefon, 2013; Stanovich & West, 2000), with a tendency 
to rely on the former shown to underlie many, if not all, probabilistic reasoning biases 
(Phillips, Fletcher, Marks and Hine, 2016) including the conjunction fallacy (Epstein, Denes-
Raj & Pacini, 1995; Toyosawa & Karasawa, 2004). 
Recent work has also linked thinking style preference to errors in probabilistic reasoning 
as a potential explanation for paranormal endorsement. Bouvet and Bonnefon (2015) found 
intuitive thinkers were less likely to offer statistical explanations for the apparent accuracy of 
a fake personal horoscope (Study 1) and a mock ESP demonstration (Study 2), with intuitive 
thinkers more inclined to accept a paranormal explanation of the latter. Similarly, Pennycook 
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et al. (2015) found paranormal belief correlated positively with faith in intuition (FI) and 
negatively with reflective thinking, with the latter measured via aggregate scores on a battery 
of 15 classic heuristics and biases tasks first assembled by Toplak, West and Stanovich, 
(2011)
5
. Unfortunately, Pennycook and colleagues did not report correlations between 
paranormal belief and CE scores alone. Finally, Prike et al (2017) separated personal 
experience of anomalous phenomena from a belief in the theoretical possibility of ESP, PK 
and LAD, as well as extraterrestrial visitation, being real. Whilst all four belief scales 
correlated positively with the number of CEs made, regression analysis revealed more 
anomalous experiences alone predicted higher CE rates. According to these authors, a 
heightened tendency to rely on intuitive-experiential thinking is most likely to explain 
believers’ tendency to attribute paranormal causes to otherwise inexplicable personal 
experiences such seemingly remarkable coincidences (co-occurrences). A theoretical belief in 
paranormal phenomena, by contrast, is more likely to reflect a reasoned analysis of, say, the 
academic parapsychological literature and/or the philosophical plausibility of such concepts 
being real. Such theoretical beliefs are less likely to shape conjunctive biases (Prike et al., 
2017). 
1.3. Study Overview & Hypotheses 
Taking an individual differences perspective, the current study attempts to replicate and 
built upon previous work by examining the extent to which stronger paranormal beliefs 
predict the making of conjunction errors for paranormal (versus non-paranormal) events 
and/or confirmatory (versus disconfirmatory) outcomes. In this way, the extent to which 
believers are especially prone to belief-congruent over belief-neutral CEs is again tested with, 
as before, belief in three types of alleged paranormal phenomena - ESP, PK and LAD - 
                                                 
5
 Toplak et al.’s (2011) battery included Tversky and Kahneman’s original “Linda problem” (see Footnote 1) as 
well as causal base-rate, sample size, regression to the mean, gambler’s fallacy, covariation detection, 
methodological reasoning, Bayesian reasoning, framing, denominator neglect, probability matching, sunk cost 
and outcome bias tasks. All tend to illicit incorrect, heuristically-driven responses. 
Running Head: PARANORMAL BELIEF, THINKING STYLE & CONFIRMATORY CONJUNCTION ERRORS 
11 
assessed separately (cf. Rogers et al., 2016). In an extension to previous work, the role 
intuitive-experiential and rational-analytic thinking play in this process is also explored. As 
such, the present study is the first to test the impact paranormal belief type and strength has 
on both general and confirmatory CE generation controlling for individual differences in 
thinking style plus relevant demographics. 
Several hypotheses are advanced. First, with relevant demographics controlled for, 
individuals with stronger paranormal beliefs (all types) will make more CE’s generally 
[H01], more CEs for paranormal over non-paranormal events [H02], more CEs for 
confirmatory over disconfirmatory outcomes [H03] and more CEs for confirmatory 
paranormal over all other conjunction types [H04] than those with less pronounced 
paranormal beliefs. Second, parallel main and interaction effects are anticipated for 
individuals reporting a lower need for cognition [H05, H06, H07 and H08 respectively] and a 
higher faith in (their own) intuition [H09, H10, H11 and H12 respectively]. Relative to 
previous work the strength of paranormal belief (all types) as a predictor of CE rates should 
be diminished once baseline differences in analytic-rational and intuitive-experiential 
thinking style have been partialled out [H13 and H14 respectively]. Finally, trends involving 
paranormal belief will be more pronounced for individuals endorsing ESP and PK over LAD 
[H15 and H16 respectively]. Given their conceptual similarity, no differences between ESP 
and PK beliefs are anticipated.  
2. Method 
2.1. Participants 
 An opportunity sample was recruited from various locations in the North-West and South 
Coast regions of England (n=262; overall response rate=81.9%). Respondents were aged 
from 16 to 84 years (M=37.1 years; SD=16.5 years) with most being female (54.0%), of 
Caucasian ethnicity (93.2%) and either employed (63.2%), retired (10.8%) or in post-
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compulsory education (12.8 %). Around two-fifths of the sample were educated to 
undergraduate degree level or better (44.8%) with a sizeable proportion qualified to this level 
in maths, statistics and/or psychology (16.5%). No other demographics details were taken.  
2.2. Design 
The study employed a 2 (event type: paranormal versus non-paranormal) x 2 (outcome 
type: confirmatory versus disconfirmatory) within subjects design with the presence (versus 
absence) of a conjunction error for each scenario serving as the dependent measure. As with 
previous studies (Rogers et al., 2016; 2017), CE generation was assessed via Generalised 
Linear Mixed Modelling (GLMM) with the aforementioned experimental factors, together 
with paranormal belief, two thinking styles (NFC and FI) plus relevant interaction terms 
entered as potential predictors, and demographic correlates entered as potential covariates. As 
before three GLMMs - each incorporating a single paranormal belief type (ESP, PK or LAD) 
- were performed. 
2.3. Materials 
A pack comprising a brief/instruction sheet, the four questionnaires describe below and a 
detachable debrief sheet was created, with a reversed version also fashioned to overcome 
possible order effects. 
2.3.1. Scenario Judgements Questionnaire (SJQ)  
Taken from Rogers et al. (2016), the SJQ contains 16 hypothetical scenarios covering a 
range of topics, with formatting the same as that in the “motorway” case illustrated above. To 
reiterate, each scenario comprised background information followed by three statements; two 
constituent events [statements (a) and (b)] plus their conjunction [statement (c)]. Background 
evidence depicted one of two event types; either an ostensibly paranormal experience (e.g., 
apparent precognition seemingly derived from taking psychic awareness classes) else a 
clearly non-paranormal occurrence (e.g., knowledge about car safety and roadworthiness 
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acquired from taking car maintenance classes). The first constituent was identical in all four 
(2 event type x 2 outcome type) experimental conditions. The second constituent was 
manipulated across two outcome types, such that the first constituent (e.g., “Erica feels 
uneasy driving her car for such a long distance”) was either inductively confirmed (i.e. 
“Whilst on the motorway, Erica’s car breaks down.”) else inductively disconfirmed (i.e. 
“Whilst on the motorway, Erica’s car works perfectly”). As before, the conjunction term 
comprised the two constituent statements connected by the term “and”. A conjunction error 
was made whenever the conjunctive term was deemed more likely than either or both 
constituents alone; that is, whenever statement (c) was given a higher subjective probability 
score than statement (a) and/or statement (b). A worked example was included in SJQ 
instructions. 
2.3.2. Belief in the Paranormal 
Paranormal belief was assessed using the Australian Sheep-Goat Scale (ASGS: 
Thalbourne & Delin, 1993) a psychometrically sound, 18 item measure of peoples' belief in 
ESP, PK and LAD (Thalbourne, 2010). Items are rated along a 7-point Likert scale from 1 
'strongly disagree' to 7 'strongly agree' with higher ASGS scores reflecting a stronger 
endorsement of each paranormal concept. 
2.3.3. Thinking Styles 
Respondents’ preferred style of thinking was assessed via the Rational-Experiential 
Inventory (REI; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj & Heier, 1996), a 31 item questionnaire 
comprising two orthogonal subscales. The first, termed Need for Cognition (NFC), reflects 
peoples’ preference for rational-analytic thinking and complex problem solving (e.g., “I 
prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve”). The second, labelled Faith in 
Intuition (FI), reflects their endorsement of and preference for intuitive-experiential thinking 
(e.g., “I believe in trusting my hunches”). For current purposes, these were rated on a 7-point 
Running Head: PARANORMAL BELIEF, THINKING STYLE & CONFIRMATORY CONJUNCTION ERRORS 
14 
Likert scale from 1 ‘extremely uncharacteristic of me’ to 7 ‘extremely characteristic of me’, 
with higher NFC and FI scores (re)coded to reflect a stronger preference for analytic-rational 
and experiential-intuitive thinking respectively. According to Epstein et al. (1996) both NFC 
(=.87) and FI (=.77) subscales demonstrate acceptable levels of internal reliability. In the 
present study, corresponding alpha coefficients reached at least .85 (see Results section). 
2.3.4. Demographics 
A standard demographics questionnaire ascertained respondents’ gender, age, ethnicity (16 
categories), occupational status (12 categories) and highest qualification both (a) generally as 
well as (b) specifically in mathematics/statistics and/or psychology (both from 1 'none' to 5 
'postgraduate/professional'). Data from a sixth category ‘other’ qualifications was dropped.  
2.4. Procedure 
Respondents were recruited from medium-sized businesses (e.g., corporate coffee shops) 
in four locations in the North-West (Preston, Blackpool, Blackburn) and South coast 
(Portsmouth) regions of England. With management permission, individuals were randomly 
approached and asked if they would like to take part in ‘a study of event likelihoods’. 
Volunteers were given brief verbal instructions and handed a questionnaire pack to complete 
on site. No time limit was set with no form of payment made. Completed questionnaires were 
returned either to the researcher (PR or EL) in person else via the national post. 
3. Results 
3.1. Preliminary Analyses 
A single under-age (<16 year old) respondent was omitted from the data set. Descriptive, 
reliability and normality data for the three paranormal belief (ASGS) and two thinking style 
(REI) subscales are presented in Table 1. As this shows, all measures had good internal 
reliability (’s≥.76) with deletion of one NFC item and one FI item improving alpha 
coefficients to the levels shown. 
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 Descriptives revealed that two of the five subscales were significantly skewed, with PK 
beliefs presenting substantial positive skew (IS=.68 SESkew=.15; Z= 4.39; p<.001) and FI 
presenting similar negative skew FI (IS=-.50 SESkew=.15; Z=3.25; p<.001). Histograms and 
Q-Q plots confirmed the non-normality of these measures, particularly PK beliefs. 
Subsequent examination of boxplots revealed six outliers, all for FI ratings. These were 
removed, with FI skew subsequently falling to the non-significant level reported in Table 1. 
Given their substantial positive skew but lack of outliers PK belief ratings were subjected to 
natural logarithmic transformation with this reducing skew to a non-significant level (IS=.05; 
SESkew=.15; Z= .30; p>.05; ns; M=.33; SD=.27; observed range from 0.00 to 0.85; 
median=.35). All future analyses incorporate log transformed PK beliefs. 
*** Table 1 here *** 
3.2. Probability Estimates and Conjunction Error Rates 
Some proportion of respondents made CEs for every scenario (observed range 34.5% to 
53.5%; M=42.0%; SD=5.7; median=42.0) rendering all suitable for inclusion in the present 
study. Overall, the total number of CEs made - hereafter the “CE rate” - was moderately high 
(observed range 0 to 15; M=6.63; SD=3.78; median=7.00; n =246), not significantly skewed 
(IS=01; SESkew=.16) and free of outliers, with histograms and Q-Q plots confirming CE data 
to be suitable for parametric analysis.  
3.3. Correlations 
Correlations between the CE rate (across all conditions) and the various individual 
difference (ASGS, REI) and demographic measures are presented in Table 2. As illustrated, 
the overall CE rate correlated positively with ESP, PK and LAD beliefs, faith in intuition (FI) 
and respondents’ (female) gender plus negatively with need for cognition (NFC) ratings. 
Unsurprisingly, the three paranormal belief types were highly inter-correlated as were the two 
thinking styles. All three belief types were associated with lower NFC and higher FI.  
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*** Table 2 here *** 
For the most part, the three paranormal belief types were more pronounced amongst 
respondents who were female, lower in age, of non-Caucasian ethnicity, a non-student and 
less qualified both generally and specifically in maths, statistics and/or psychology. Two 
exceptions were found. First, PK beliefs were unrelated to maths, statistics and/or 
psychology-specific qualification levels and second, LAD beliefs were not associated with 
respondents’ Caucasian (versus non-Caucasian) ethnicity. Relationships between 
demographics and the two thinking styles were less clear-cut. Whilst higher NFC was 
associated with Caucasian ethnicity plus more general and more maths/statistics/psychology-
specific qualifications, higher FI was associated only with student (vs. non-student) 
occupational status and general qualification levels. With a few exceptions, the six 
demographic items were inter-correlated. No evidence of predictor multicollinearity was 
found (all r’s ≤.61) with no paranormal belief  thinking style correlation exceeding r=.35. 
3.4. Correlations across Event  Outcome Types 
Correlations between CE rates and all individual difference measures across the four (2 
event type  2 outcome type) experimental conditions are given in Table 3. Noticeably, 
positive CE  belief correlations were found for three of the four conditions, the exception 
being that PK beliefs were unrelated to CEs for paranormal disconfirmatory scenarios. 
Noticeably stronger r coefficients were observed for (all) confirmatory relative to 
disconfirmatory scenarios.  
*** Table 3 here *** 
As Table 3 also shows, negative CE  NFC correlations along with (marginally) positive 
CE  FI correlations were observed for all conditions except paranormal disconfirmatory 
scenarios. Positive CE  gender correlations were also (marginally) significant regardless of 
condition with these stronger for females then for males. Finally, negative CE  age 
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correlations were observed for all conditions except those for confirmatory paranormal 
scenarios which were negative in sign. No other consistent pattern of CE  demographic 
correlations emerged.  
3.5. Generalised Linear Mixed Modelling 
The extent to which scenario event type, outcome type, strength of paranormal belief, 
thinking style (NFC and FI) preference plus relevant interaction terms predicted the presence 
versus absence of conjunction errors (“CE generation”) were examined via Generalised 
Linear Mixed Modelling with, as previously noted, one GLMM conducted per paranormal 
belief type (ESP, PK or LAD)
6. In each case respondents’ gender and age were entered as 
potential covariates (cf. Table 2). In line with guidelines (Field, 2013; Norušis, 2007) all non-
dichotomous predictors were grand mean centred prior to analyses with the criteria reference 
point set to the non-making of CEs (i.e. to correct conjunctive judgements).  
3.5.1. Model Structure & Fit 
Separate GLMMs assessed scaled identity then diagonal, first order auto-regression (AR1) 
and compound symmetry covariance structures, again one per paranormal belief type. Models 
with compound symmetry structures failed to converge with, in all cases, the AR1 structure 
producing the best model fit. 
GLMMs also assessed the unique contribution each additional predictor (step) made to the 
overall model fit. In most steps, inclusion of the next predictor improved model fit to a 
significant or near-significant degree. The exceptions were inclusion of the NFC  event  
outcome interaction term at Step 15 for all paranormal belief types, and inclusion of the FI  
                                                 
6
 As noted elsewhere (Rogers et al., 2016) GLMM is a more flexible extension of standard regression analysis in 
that it differentiates fixed from random effects. Further, GLMM is able to overcome potential limitations of 
missing data, non-independent observations, non-homogeneous regression slopes, non-constant error variance 
and for within subjects design, non-sphericity, this raising statistical power (see Field, 2013). As such, GLMM 
was deemed most suitable for current purposes.  
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event  outcome interaction at Step 15 for the LAD beliefs model. Inclusion of the random 
(versus fixed) intercept also improved the overall fit of each model regardless of belief type. 
Full details of these model fit data are provided in Supplementary Tables 1 to 3.  
3.5.2. Statistical Power 
The final sample of 259 respondents (4144 cases) was comparable to previous research of 
on this topic (Rogers et al., 2016). Power analysis confirmed that for an omnibus logistic 
regression
7
 with 16 predictors/covariates,  set to .05 and statistical power (1-) set to .95, an 
n of 259 was sufficient to detect small-to-medium effect sizes (ƒ2=.12). 
3.5.3. Classification Accuracy 
Table 4 shows that for the three models with a fixed intercept, respondents correctly 
classified around 16-20% of conjunction errors, just under 90% of non-errors and just under 
60% of all responses regardless of whether ESP, PK or LAD beliefs served as the belief-
based predictor. Inclusion of the random intercept term increased classification accuracy for 
errors to around 57-58%, for non-errors to roughly 80% and for all responses to just over 
70%, again in all three belief-based models. With GLMM analyses requiring inclusion of the 
random intercept on conceptual grounds (Twisk, 2006), only random intercept models with 
an AR1 covariance structure are discussed further.  
*** Table 4 here *** 
3.5.4. Predictors of Conjunction Error Generation 
Table 5 presents inferential statistics for each of the three belief-based models. In each 
case the AR1 diagonal statistic was highly significant indicating a lack of homogeneity in 
estimated variance-covariance residuals - hence non-consistent unexplained variance - across 
different level 1 variables (here, the 16 scenarios). AR1 rho indicates the degree of first-order 
autocorrelation between residuals across the level 1 variable (scenarios) given the same 
                                                 
7
 With G*Power (Buchner, Erdfelder, Faul & Lang, 1992-2008) not offering power analysis for GLMMs, an 
omnibus test of logistic regressions is reported as a proxy for current analyses. 
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“contextual” variable (here, respondent id). As Table 5 shows, all three AR1 rho statistics 
were significant implying that some unexamined factor(s) within each respondent had 
significant impact on CE generation (Field, 2013).  
*** Table 5 here *** 
As Table 5 also shows, neither respondent gender nor respondent age predicted the 
making (versus non-making) of CEs to a significant degree in any model. Nevertheless, 
subsequent findings are for when these two demographic measures are controlled for.  
3.5.4.1. Event and Outcome Types: Event and outcome types failed to predict CE 
generation either uniquely or in combination.  
3.5.4.2. Paranormal Belief: As expected, all three paranormal belief types predicted CE 
generation in their own right with exp(b) coefficients for ESP, PK and LAD beliefs being 
1.32, 3.16 and 1.27 respectively (see Table 5). Thus, with all other predictors set at the 
respective means (i.e. “averaged”) a unit increase in ESP beliefs heightened the odds of 
making (versus not making) a CE by approximately a third. A comparable unit increase in PK 
beliefs enhanced the odds of CE generation over threefold
8
 whereas a unit increase in LAD 
beliefs raised them by just over a quarter. In short, H01 was fully supported.  
The lack of any significant belief  event interactions suggest the above trends existed 
regardless of whether scenarios depicted an ostensibly paranormal or a clearly non-
paranormal event, meaning H02 is unsupported.  
By comparison, three significant belief  outcome interactions (one per belief type) 
emerged. Relevant exp(b) coefficients indicate that with all other predictors averaged, the 
shift from a disconfirmatory to a confirmatory outcome (coded -1 and +1 respectively) 
combined with a unit increase in ESP beliefs meant the odds of making a CE increased by a 
ratio of .76. In other words, as ESP beliefs increased by one unit, respondents were 1/.76 or 
                                                 
8
 As already noted, PK beliefs were subjected to natural logarithmic transformation which, by definition, alters 
the precise relationship this belief type has on the odds of CE generation. 
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1.32 times more likely to make a CE for confirmatory relative to disconfirmatory outcomes 
(cf. Field, 2013). By similar reasoning, as PK beliefs increased by one unit, respondents were 
1/.25 or four times more likely to make a confirmatory CE relative to a disconfirmatory CE. 
Finally, a unit increase in LAD beliefs meant respondents were 1/.78 or 1.28 times more 
susceptible to confirmatory over disconfirmatory CE generation. Simple effects analyses - 
with  adjusted to .0125 - confirmed that stronger ESP believers, b=.27; t=3.80; p<.001; 
exp(b)=1.31; CI95[1.14, 1.51], stronger PK believers, b=1.09; t=2.88; p=.004; exp(b)=2.98; 
CI95[1.42, 6.28], and stronger LAD believers, b=.22; t=3.39; p=.001; exp(b)=1.25; CI95[1.10, 
1.42] were more likely to make CEs for confirmatory outcomes than were those with weaker 
ESP, PK and LAD beliefs respectively. This was not the case when scenario outcomes were 
disconfirmatory in nature (all p’s >.500; ns). In sum, H03 is fully supported.  
Finally, the absence of any significant three-way belief  event  outcome interactions 
suggest odds ratios for confirmatory versus disconfirmatory CEs were unaffected by whether 
scenarios depicted an ostensibly paranormal or a clearly non-paranormal event. Hence, H04 
is unsupported.  
3.5.4.3. Rational-Analytic Thinking: As expected, lower NFC predicted heightened CE 
generation in all three models. Specifically, with all other predictors averaged, a unit increase 
in NFC unit lowered the odds of making (versus not making) a CE by approximately a 
quarter regardless of whether ESP, PK or LAD beliefs served as the belief-based predictor. 
Turned around, a unit decrease in NFC raised the odds of CE generation by around a quarter 
irrespective of paranormal belief type. As such, H05 is supported.  
The lack of any significant NFC  event interactions suggests the above trends were just 
as prominent for paranormal as for non-paranormal events, meaning H06 is unsupported. 
That said, three near-significant NFC  outcome interactions were found, having exp(b) 
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coefficients of 1.25, 1.23 and 1.24 for the ESP, PK and LAD based models respectively
9
. 
Thus, with all other predictors averaged, the shift from a disconfirmatory to a confirmatory 
outcome combined with a unit increase in NFC ratings meant the odds of CE generation 
increased by (roughly) a quarter. Given that all three NFC  outcome interactions are 
marginally significant, H07 can be accepted with caution. The absence of any significant 
three-way interactions involving NFC means the aforementioned trend does not differ across 
paranormal versus non-paranormal event types. Thus, H08 remains fully unsupported.  
3.5.4.4. Intuitive-Experiential Thinking: For the most part FI scores had little impact on 
CE generation. The sole exception was the near-significant main effect FI had within the PK-
based model where a unit increase in FI raised the likelihood of CE generation by a quarter. 
At first glance, this marginal effect appears to offer partial support for H09. However, 
because it occurs only within the PK-based model, with such beliefs subjected to a 
logarithmic transformation, overall evidence points to H09 being unsupported. The absence 
of any significant two or three-way interactions involving FI means H10, H11 and H12 are 
unsupported too.  
3.5.4.5. Paranormal Belief Net of Thinking Style. Rogers et al. (2016), who did not control 
for baseline differences in thinking style preference, report b coefficients for ESP, PK and 
LAD beliefs (as predictors of CEs generally) to be .18, .19 and .14 respectively
10
. In the 
current study, corresponding b coefficients were .28, 1.15 and .24 respectively. Thus, with 
NFC and FI both controlled for, the predictive strength of ESP, PK and LAD beliefs 
increased, contrary to hypotheses. Whilst a direct cross-study comparison for PK beliefs is 
not possible due to their logarithmic transformation in the present work overall directional 
trends point to both H13 and H14 being unsupported. 
                                                 
9
 The similarity in exp(b) coefficients for (a) NFC and (b) NFC  outcome interactions is unsurprisingly given 
that these predictors do not incorporate a paranormal belief type element. 
10
 Rogers et al. (2016) did not report exp(b) coefficients. 
Running Head: PARANORMAL BELIEF, THINKING STYLE & CONFIRMATORY CONJUNCTION ERRORS 
22 
3.5.4.6. Comparison of Paranormal Belief Types: In the current study, significant main 
and interaction effects involving ESP and LAD beliefs were virtually identical with, by 
comparison, those involving PK beliefs noticeably stronger. However, with PK beliefs 
subjected to natural logarithmic transformation direct comparison of (the strength of) these 
relationships cannot be made (Field, 2013). As such, H15 remains unsupported whilst support 
for H16 cannot at present be determined.  
4. Discussion  
The three GLMMs with AR1 covariance structures all predicted the presence (vs. absence) 
of conjunction errors to a significant degree, indicating all scenarios were suitable for current 
purposes. Several hypotheses were supported.  
First, stronger paranormal belief was associated with more CEs supporting previous 
claims that believers are especially prone to the conjunction fallacy (Brotherton & French, 
2014; Dagnall, Denoven et al., 2016; Prike et al., 2017; Rogers et al., 2009; 2011, 2016; 
2017) and by implication, to probabilistic reasoning biases (Rogers, 2015) and certain 
cognitive “deficits” (French & Stone, 2014; Irwin, 2009). Such findings contrast with those 
of Dagnall and colleagues (2007; 2014; 2016) who found no relationship between paranormal 
belief and fallacy proneness. 
Second, believers’ made as many CEs regardless of whether background evidence 
depicted an ostensibly paranormal versus clearly non-paranormal event. This replicates 
previous claims that believers’ fallacy proneness is not exclusive to ostensibly paranormal 
events (Brotherton & French, 2014; Rogers et al., 2009; 201l, 2016). It would seem believers’ 
proneness to a generic or context-free conjunction fallacy is now well established. By 
extension, potential differences in the objective odds of paranormal versus non-paranormal 
co-occurrences (“scenario asymmetry”) had no impact on respondents’ proneness to 
conjunctive biases with background evidence just as inductively confirming (cf. Tentori et 
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al., 2013) irrespective of whether it depicted an ostensibly paranormal or a clearly non-
paranormal event. 
Third, whilst outcome type had no main impact on CE rates three highly significant belief 
 outcome interactions were found. The implication here is that stronger paranormal 
believers demonstrated more extreme confirmatory conjunction biases than those relatively 
sceptical of paranormal claims. Whilst current findings are contrary to the pro-paranormal 
confirmation biases found for other cognitive (e.g., learning and memory) tasks (Russell & 
Jones, 1980; Wiseman et al., 2003), they do support previous claims that paranormal 
believers are especially susceptible to a generic (context-free) and confirmatory conjunction 
fallacy (Rogers et al., 2016) with inductive confirmation, for some unknown reason, more 
applicable to paranormal believers irrespective of event type. One possibility is that believers 
simply require less evidence of inductive confirmation because they are less inclined towards 
critical reasoning (French & Stone, 2014; Irwin, 2009), this time in relation to conjunctive 
probability estimations. Such argument is consistent with the notion that paranormal believers 
and sceptics have a different internal representation of what constitutes a random event, with 
believers requiring less subjective evidence of relatedness before they start to see meaningful 
patterns in what is essentially meaningless data (e.g. Hadlackzy & Westerfield, 2011; see 
Rogers, 2015). 
In the current study, all three paranormal belief types were strongly associated with 
confirmatory CEs. Noticeably, the predictive strength of ESP beliefs was virtually identical to 
that of LAD beliefs
11
. From this it would seem that some underlying dimension - presumably 
a “global” tendency to endorse all paranormal claims relating to ESP, PK and LAD accounts 
for believers’ heightened proneness to confirmatory conjunction biases. Thus, current trends 
are consistent with Rogers et al. (2106) who report greater fallacy proneness in relation ESP, 
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Again, direct comparison with logarithmically transformed PK beliefs should not be made. 
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PK and to a lesser (marginal) extent LAD endorsement. Thus, previous work by Rogers and 
colleagues (2016) has, for the most part, been replicated and extended more robustly to 
individuals accepting the veracity of life after death.  
4.2. Thinking Style Preference 
Consistent with a host of previous studies (e.g., Irwin, 2015; Lobato et al., 2014), 
paranormal believers demonstrated a lower preference for rational-analytic thinking as well 
as a stronger preference for intuitive-experiential thinking. As hypothesised, lower rational-
analytic thinking predicted more CEs generally whereas, contrary to hypotheses, intuitive-
experiential thinking was, on the whole, unrelated to overall CE rates. Only in the PK model 
did stronger intuitive preference even approach significance as a CE predictor (p=.057) with 
this most likely a statistical artefact. Together, current suggest susceptibility to the 
conjunction fallacy reflects a tendency to avoid analytic-rational thinking rather than to 
knowingly rely on one’s intuitions. One possibility is that rationality-avoidant individuals do 
not over-ride their automatic (heuristical) processing with a more reflective consideration of 
conjunctive problems, thereby highlighting potential limitations in their own metacognitive 
awareness (cf. De Neys & Bonnefon, 2013; Pennycook et al., 2012).  
Neither NFC nor FI predicted CE generation for paranormal over non-paranormal events, 
contradicting previous evidence linking preference for intuitive-experiential thinking to a pro-
paranormal interpretation of anomalous experiences (cf. Bouvet & Bonnefon, 2015; Prike et 
al., 2015). By comparison, NFC  outcome interactions were marginally predictive of CEs in 
all three belief-based models (p values from .058 to .076), with individuals who prefer to 
avoid analytic-rational thinking making marginally more confirmatory CEs than (a) they did 
for disconfirmatory CEs and (b) relative to individuals who prefer to engage in analytic-
rational thinking. By comparison, preference for intuitive-experiential thinking was unrelated 
to both confirmatory and disconfirmatory CE rates. It is possible rationality-avoidant 
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individuals stopped trying to solve confirmatory conjunction tasks using reasoned analysis 
because they found these - but for some reason not disconfirmatory tasks - too challenging. 
Future studies should consider assessing the perceived difficulty of conjunction problems 
directly. 
4.3. Follow-Up Analyses 
Controlling for individual differences in both NFC and FI appeared to raise the predictive 
strength of ESP, PK and LAD beliefs. The implication here is that individual differences in 
preferred thinking style acts as a CE buffer in relation to all three types of paranormal 
endorsement (Rogers et al., 2016). However, as one anonymous reviewer suggested, it is still 
possible baseline differences in rational and/or intuitive thinking style account for why 
paranormal believers make more conjunction errors. To explore this claim further, follow-up 
GLMMs were performed this time with paranormal belief, low versus high NFC, low versus 
high FI, outcome type and all relevant interaction terms entered as potential predictors. With 
main analyses revealing no main or interaction effects involving paranormal versus non- 
paranormal event types this variable was omitted. All other model characteristics were 
identical to those previously reported with three GLMMs - one per paranormal belief type - 
again performed
12
. Overall, classification accuracy rates for the three follow-up models were 
very similar to those initially reported, with the six paranormal belief  thinking style 
interactions having little, if any, impact on (confirmatory) CE rates. Such trends confirm that 
baseline differences in NFC and/or FI could not explain believers’ higher propensity for 
making confirmatory CEs. 
4.4. Theoretical Implications 
Current findings suggest stronger paranormal believers are more influenced by - and so 
make more errors for - conjunctive scenarios containing a confirmatory outcome than those 
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 Full details are provided as supplementary data. 
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who are more sceptical of paranormal claims. With such trends emerging for ESP, PK and 
LAD believers regardless of event paranormality, it would seem believers are not swayed 
simply by the presentation of belief-congruent evidence (cf. Russell & Jones, 1980; Wiseman 
et al., 2003). As such, current trends replicate paranormal believers proneness to a generic 
(context free) confirmatory conjunction fallacy first reported by Rogers et al. (2016). 
Overall, stronger believers appear to behave in a more normative manner when outcomes 
are characterised by disconfirmatory evidence, the implication being that they rely more on 
heuristical (System 1) processes when judging confirmatory conjunctions (cf. Pennycook et 
al., 2015). However, if believers’ preference for intuitive-experiential thinking co-varied 
straightforwardly with their level and type of paranormal endorsement, one would also expect 
significant FI  outcome interactions to emerge. Such interactions were not observed in any 
of the three belief-based models. Whilst there would be some shared variance between faith 
in intuition and all three types of paranormal belief (cf. Table 2), individual differences that 
are unique to FI do not appear to differentially affect the likelihood of paranormal believers 
making conjunctive errors.  
Follow-up analyses incorporating belief  thinking style interactions confirm that baseline 
differences in FI had no impact on believers’ susceptibility to a (confirmatory) conjunction 
fallacy. From this it would seem intuitive-experiential (System 1) processing is not the main 
driver of believers’ heightened susceptibility to conjunctive biases, confirmatory or otherwise 
(cf. Pennycook et al., 2015; Prike et al., 2017). Other factors underlying ESP, PK and LAD 
beliefs seem to be more relevant.  
Instead, the impact paranormal belief had on CE generation depended, to some extent, on 
respondents’ preference for rational-analytic (System 2) thinking (cf. Pennycook et al., 2012). 
However, this was (marginally) true of just LAD believers. At first glance, current findings 
suggest individuals who are sceptical of an afterlife and who prefer cognitive engagement 
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were less prone to confirmatory CEs - and by implication, had a better (reasoned) 
understanding of the conjunctive rule - than all other LAD belief  NFC groups. Presumably 
motivational factors such as a need to believe (Thalbourne, 1996) were more important for 
LAD supporters who like to engage in reasoned argument. That said, the low and marginal 
level of significance (p=.062) coupled with multiple testing means this finding could easily 
be a statistical artefact. Given the acknowledged limitations of median split analysis 
(MacCallum, Zhang, Preacher & Rucker, 2002) conclusions pertaining to the near-significant 
LAD belief  NFC interaction reported here should be treated with caution. Replication is 
required. 
Current findings can also be viewed from an inductive confirmation standpoint. According 
to Tentori et al.’s (2013) Confirmation-Theoretical Framework, CE generation is shaped by 
the degree to which background information increases the perceived credibility of – that is, 
inductively confirms - the second constituent event. Here, the magnitude of inductive 
confirmation is related to the difference between prior probabilities versus posterior 
probabilities. In Bayesian terms, the prior probability reflects the underlying frequency with 
which a given event occurs (e.g., the number of people in a total workforce who receive a pay 
rise on a randomly selected day) and thus represents the base rate likelihood of that event 
occurring. By comparison, the posterior probability reflects the extent to which some piece of 
individuating evidence affects the likelihood of the specific event in question (e.g., the extent 
to which a give employee receives a pay rise if he/she gets a job promotion). As such, it 
represents the conditional probability of that event occurring.  
In the present “motorway” scenario, the prior (base rate) probability reflects the likelihood 
of Erica car breaking down based on the frequency with which cars of a similar make, model 
and age break down in general. By contrast, the posterior (conditional) probability reflects the 
likelihood that Erica’s car breaks down given that she feels uneasy about driving it long 
Running Head: PARANORMAL BELIEF, THINKING STYLE & CONFIRMATORY CONJUNCTION ERRORS 
28 
distances (taking account of her supposedly enhanced awareness as to the car’s condition). 
The conjunctive question thus becomes how likely is it that Erica’s car will break down given 
her supposedly enhanced awareness of her car’s condition. From a CTF perspective, Erica’s 
sense of uneasiness represents individuating background information with, in the language of 
CTF, stronger believers making more CEs when background evidence - here, presented as 
scenario content plus the first constituent - was inductively confirmed (i.e. deemed credible) 
by the second constituent event. For believers, this was the case regardless of whether 
background evidence depicted an ostensibly paranormal hence belief-congruent event 
(Erica’s sense of uneasiness supposedly derived from her developing psychic ability) or a 
clearly non-paranormal thus belief-neutral event (Erica’s sense of uneasiness appearing to 
stem from her developing knowledge of car maintenance)
13
. From this, it is possible stronger 
paranormal believers are more influenced by the individuating information and more prone to 
neglecting base rates, (cf. Kahneman & Tversky, 1973) than non-believers, again regardless 
of event type. Alternatively, it is possible paranormal sceptics attach too much weight to base 
rate likelihoods, a tendency known as conservatism (Edwards, Lindman, & Phillips, 1965). 
Both forms of over-reliance affect the degree of inductive confirmation and thus the 
likelihood of (confirmatory) CEs being made. However, at present, support for these claims 
evidence is mixed with previous studies reported either a positive else no significant 
relationship between paranormal belief and base rate neglect (Dagnall et al., 2007; 2014; 
Pennycook et al., 2012; Study 2). Further exploration of believers’ fallacy proneness taken 
from a CTF standpoint seems necessary.  
To date, disconfirmatory conjunctions have received limited academic attention with the 
two fallacy mechanisms suggested by Tversky and Kahneman (1983) both confirmatory in 
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 In the present context, belief incongruent evidence would be depicted as paranormal disconfirming rather than 
non-paranormal scenario content. 
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nature. In Tversky and Kahneman’s M→A paradigm background information facilitates the 
construction of an internalized model (M) which subsequently confirms occurrence of the 
first constituent event (A) but not the second (B). By extension, the conjunction of events (A 
and B) is also confirmed by M, with this conjunctive outcome deemed more likely than 
occurrence of the second constituent alone. Such processing forms the basis of Tversky and 
Kahneman’s classic “Linda problem” (see footnote 1). In Tversky and Kahneman’s 
alternative AB paradigm prior occurrence of the first constituent makes the second seem 
more likely, with the former providing a plausible explanation of the latter. Thus, for 
positively conditionally related constituents, the likelihood of CE generation increases (see 
e.g., Rogers et al., 2017) 
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1983) two paradigms can both be integrated into Tentori et al.’s 
(2013) Confirmation-Theoretical Framework. In Tversky and Kahneman’s original M→A 
paradigm, each model (M) confirms occurrence of the second constituent event (B). In their 
alternative A→B paradigm, the positive conditional relationship between constituent events 
means prior occurrence of the first (A) confirms subsequent occurrence of the second (B). In 
the present study, confirmatory conjunction scenarios correspond to the A→B mechanism. 
Finally, whilst Tversky and Kahneman (1983) acknowledged disconfirmatory conjunctions 
are possible they provided no explanation for them. Disconfirmatory conjunctions – which 
are characterised by a negative conditional relationship such that prior occurrence of the first 
constituent signals non-occurrence of the second (A→ not B) - can be accommodated within 
Tentori et al.’s (2013) CTF. Here, a theoretical A→ not B mechanism assumed to apply. 
Indeed, current findings suggest individuals tend to avoid making CEs when confronted by an 
A→ not B condition, with this being the case regardless of individual differences in their 
level, and to some extent type, of paranormal belief.  
4.5. Methodological Issues and Ideas for Future Research 
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As with previous studies of this ilk (e.g., Rogers et al., 2016; 2017), the current study 
utilised a general population sample from several UK locations, presented a range of 
hypothetical conjunction scenarios and retained continuous measures of paranormal belief. 
Despite these strengths a number of methodological issues remain. 
First, the natural logarithmic transformation of PK beliefs has implications for the 
interpretation of findings (Field, 2013). Having been transformed a one unit increase at the 
bottom end of the PK beliefs scale will have greater impact on the likelihood of CE 
generation than a one unit increase at the top end of this scale. Thus, as PK beliefs strengthen 
the impact such beliefs have on CE incidence becomes progressively weaker. Whether this 
reflects a genuine trend or is an artefact of the logarithmic transformation itself remains 
unclear. Either way, it complicates cross-study comparisons (cf. Rogers et al., 2016). 
Second, it is possible some disconfirmatory outcomes were not explicit enough in their 
rejection of the paranormal hypothesis. In the present “inheritance” scenario for instance, 
being told by a medium [lawyer] that there is a chance of a £1 million bequest (first 
constituent) which is then not received (second constituent) may not be deemed an outright 
disconfirmation of the initial claim because the first constituent was not absolute in its 
prediction (i.e. did not state there is will definitely be a £1 million bequest). In principle this 
could explain the lack of any three-way belief  event  outcome interactions. Whilst 
previous work employing different scenarios suggests this is not the case (Rogers, 2009), 
future studies should consider such a possibility.  
Third, it should also be noted that the sixteen scenarios utilised here reflect a mix of 
ostensibly paranormal events which included, but were not limited, ESP, PK and LAD (one 
outlined an apparent out-of-body experience). It is possible different types of paranormal 
belief interact with scenario content to create individual differences in the extent to which 
background evidence is deemed plausible hence inductively confirming with, for example, 
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stronger ESP believers not necessarily accepting scenarios indicative of an afterlife. Whilst 
evidence that believers are more prone to confirmatory CEs regardless of whether they 
endorse ESP, PK or LAD suggests otherwise, future research should examine different 
paranormal belief types utilising belief-specific conjunctions (e.g., ESP believers should be 
asked to judge paranormal conjunctions indicative of ESP only). This would provide a more 
nuanced test of current hypotheses. 
Similarly, some scenarios may have been interpreted by different types of paranormal 
believer as having a different underlying mechanism. For instance, the paranormal version of 
the “Career” scenario - which depicted a fortune telling - may have been interpreted as an 
astrological rather than psychic reading (Hines, 2003). Future studies should remove such 
ambiguities.  
As stated in Footnote 3, sceptics are less likely to perceive paranormal scenarios as being 
credible. Whilst the lack of any event type effect implies this was not an issue the general 
point remains; where background evidence is viewed as implausible or irrelevant, fallacy 
generation will be less likely. It is conceivable that believers and sceptics were equally 
rejecting of background evidence for at least some of the ostensibly paranormal events 
depicted here. Future research might consider assessing, and perhaps controlling for, the 
perceived credibility and/or plausibility of scenario content.  
Fourth, future studies should explore confirmatory CE proneness in believers who merely 
report more anomalous experiences versus those who are more incline to attribute paranormal 
causation to anomalous events (Irwin, Dagnall & Drinkwater, 2013). Following Prike et al. 
(2017) the former seem more likely to make confirmatory CEs than the latter. 
Other types of thinking disposition such as inflexible, dogmatic or absolutist thinking 
(e.g., Stanovich & West, 1998) could also be tested in the current context. That said, it has 
recently been argued that limitations in peoples’ metacognitive awareness mean self-report 
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measures such as the NFC and FI are a poor measure of peoples’ actual thinking style and 
that behavioural (objective) measures of heuristical processing - such as Toplak et al.’s 
(2011) heuristics and biases battery - should be employed instead (Pennycook, Ross, Koehler 
& Fugelsang, 2017). Such argument calls into question the external validity of the NFC and 
FI subscales. Future studies employing the self-report thinking style measures should bear 
such criticism in mind. Relatedly, the extent to which believers’ susceptibility to 
confirmatory CEs reflect their broader misperception of randomness should be tested by 
including appropriate, behaviourally-based randomness judgement tasks (cf. Dagnall et al., 
2014). 
Finally, the proportion of non-Caucasian respondents sampled here was relatively low 
(6.8%) meaning current findings have limited generalisability in terms of ethnic background. 
With ethnicity known to impact on the levels and type of paranormal endorsement (French & 
Stone, 2014; Irwin, 2009), future research should aim for more representative sampling. 
4.6. Conclusion 
Current findings replicate previous claims that paranormal believers are especially prone 
to a generic (context free) and confirmatory conjunction fallacy, extending these trends more 
robustly to LAD believers too. Such biases were found to exist regardless of individual 
differences in thinking style preference hence the tendency either to shun analytic (System 2) 
reasoning and/or rely on intuitive (System 1) processes when judging conjunctive events. 
Consistent with Tentori et al.’s (2013) Confirmation-Theoretical Framework, it seems 
paranormal believers are for some reason more influenced by inductively confirming 
background evidence than are paranormal sceptics. More research is needed to further 
explore the precise psychological mechanisms underlying this seemingly robust effect. 
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Table 1: Internal Reliability, Descriptive, Normality & Skew Statistics for All Measures (Final Versions)
†
 
  Reliability  Descriptives  Normality  Skew  
Scale Subscale No. Items   M (SD) Obs. Range Median  K-S df p   IS (SE) Z IS  
                    
ASGS ESP 10 .93  3.43 (1.47) 1.00 to 7.00  3.50   .07 256 .002 **   .12 .15 .81    
 PK 05 .90   2.59 (1.56) 1.00 to 7.00  2.20  .15 253 .000 ***  .68 .15 4.39 ***  
 LAD 03 .76  3.55 (1.64) 1.00 to 7.00  3.67   .08 256 .001 **   .08 .15 .50    
                     
REI Need For Cognition 18 .86  4.44 (  .88) 2.00 to 7.00  4.33   .07 251 .010 *   .23 .15 1.51    
 Faith in Intuition 11 .85   4.86 (  .93) 1.27 to 6.82 4.91   .07 251 .005 **   -.50 .15 -3.25 ***  
                    
† Data for final versions of each subscale; internal reliability given by Cronbach’s alpha () coefficient; potential ranges from 1:00 to 7:00; normality indicated by Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) tests. Significant at the *p<.05 **p<.01 and *** p<.001 
levels; a=approaches significance (two-tailed; n=251 to 256). ‡ Subscale subsequently omitted. PK belief ratings subsequently transformed. 
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Table 2: Correlations (r) between Conjunction Error Rate, Thinking Style & Demographic Measures
†
  
Scale Subscale Total CEs ESP 
 
PK 
 
LAD 
 
NFC 
 
FI 
              
CEs Total             
ASGS ESP .24 ***                     
 PK .19 *** .82 ***                 
 LAD .22 *** .80 *** .71 ***             
REI NFC -.08 *** -.24 *** -.29 *** -.24 ***         
 FI .10 *** .30 *** .24 *** .34 *** .06 ***     
Demogs Gender† .07 *** .18 *** .12 *** .25 *** -.11 *** .09 *** 
 Age .06 ** -.07 *** -.11 *** -.06 ** -.01   .01   
 Ethnicity† .02   -.05 ** -.08 *** -.03   .06 *** .03   
 Occupation† .00   -.05 ** -.05 ** -.04 * .02   -.04 * 
 Quals (gen) .00   -.17 *** -.16 *** -.15 *** .35 *** -.04 * 
 Quals (m/s/p) -.02   -.05 ** -.01   -.05 ** .19 *** -.01   
              
†Total CEs across all conditions; PK Beliefs subjected to natural logarithmic transformation; for dichotomous demographic measures higher scores reflect female gender, Caucasian ethnicity and student occupational 
status; the suffix m/s/p = maths/statistics/psychology; associations with one dichotomous measure given by  rpb; associations between two dichotomous measures given by phi. Significant effects  at the *p<.05 **p<.01 
and *** p<.001 level ; a=approaches significance (two-tailed; n=219-255). 
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Table 2: Correlations (r) between Conjunction Error Rate, Thinking Style & Demographic Measures (continued)
 † 
Scale Subscale 
 
Gender 
 
Age 
Ethnicity 
(Caucasian) 
Occupation 
(student) 
Qualifications 
(general) 
Qualifications 
(m/s/p) 
              
Demogs Gender†             
 Age -.05 **                     
 Ethnicity† .08 *** .06 ***                 
 Occupation† .00   -.38 *** .01               
 Quals (gen) -.10 *** -.05 ** -.05 ** -.03           
 Quals (m/s/p) -.15 *** -.17 *** -.03 a .06 ** .61 ***     
              
†Total CEs across all conditions; PK Beliefs subjected to natural logarithmic transformation; for dichotomous demographic measures higher scores reflect female gender, Caucasian ethnicity and student occupational 
status; the suffix m/s/p = maths/statistics/psychology; associations with one dichotomous measure given by  rpb; associations between two dichotomous measures given by phi. Significant effects  at the *p<.05 **p<.01 
and *** p<.001 level ; a=approaches significance (two-tailed; n=219-255). 
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Table 3: Correlations (r) between Conjunction Error Rate, Thinking Style & Demographics across Event & Outcome Types
† 
  Paranormal  Non-paranormal  All 
Scale Subscale Confirm Disconfirm All  Confirm Disconfirm All  Confirm Disconfirm All 
                      
ASGS ESP .29 *** .05 ** .20 ***  .28 *** .11 *** .23 ***  .33 *** .10 *** .24 *** 
 PK .27 *** .01   .17 ***  .23 *** .07 *** .18 ***  .29 *** .05 ** .19 *** 
 LAD .30 *** .04 * .20 ***  .27 *** .08 *** .20 ***  .33 *** .07 *** .22 *** 
REI NFC -.21 *** -.01   -.13 ***  -.10 *** .05 ** -.03 a  -.17 *** .02   -.08 *** 
 FI .17 *** .03   .12 ***  .07 *** .03 a .06 ***  .13 *** .03 * .10 *** 
Demogs Gender† .08 *** .03 a .07 ***  .07 *** .07 *** .08 ***  .08 *** .05 ** .07 *** 
 Age -.08 *** .09 *** .01    .04 * .13 *** .10 ***  -.02   .13 *** .06 ** 
 Ethnicity† -.03  .03 a .00    -.05 ** .10 *** .03 *  -.04 ** .08 *** .02   
 Occupation† -.02  -.04 ** -.04 *  .05 ** .00   .03    .02   -.03   .00   
 Quals (gen) -.13 *** .12 *** .00    .00   .03 a .02    -.07 *** .08 *** .00   
 Quals (m/s/p) -.08 *** .05 ** -.01    .01   -.05 ** -.02    -.03 a .00   -.02   
                      
† Conjunction error rate reflects total number of CEs made across relevant scenarios; PK Beliefs subjected to natural logarithmic transformation; for dichotomous demographic measures higher scores reflect female 
gender, Caucasian ethnicity and student occupational status; the suffix m/s/p = maths/statistics/psychology; associations with one dichotomous measure given by  rpb; associations between two dichotomous 
measures given by phi. Significant effects  at the *p<.05 **p<.01 and *** p<.001 level; a=approaches significance (two-tailed; cases from 3,424 to 4,106) 
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Table 4: Percentage of Conjunction Errors, Non-Errors & All Responses Correctly 
Predicted by Paranormal Belief & Intercept Types
†
 
Response Intercept  ESP  PK  LAD  
Type Type  (%)  (%)  (%)  
  
 
 
   
 
 
Errors Fixed  19.6   16.0   17.2  
 
Random  58.2  57.7  58.3  
  
            
Non-errors Fixed  88.3  89.9  89.1  
 
Random  80.0   80.8   81.0  
  
 
 
   
 
 
All Fixed  59.4  58.9  58.9  
 
Random  70.8   71.1   71.5  
 
 
 
   
 
 
† PK Beliefs subjected to natural logarithmic transformation; models with first order auto-regressive (AR1) covariance structure; figures to 
one decimal place (n=3,777 to 3,793 cases). 
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Table 5: Predictors of Conjunction Error Generation (Presence vs. Absence) by Paranormal Belief Type† 
 
ESP  PK  LAD  
 
   
  
95% CI    
   
95% CI   
    
95% CI  
Predictor b t p 
 
exp(b) Lwr Upr  b t p 
 
exp(b) Lwr Upr  b t p 
 
exp(b) Lwr Upr  
 
   
    
   
    
   
    
   
Random Intercept 1.07 .52 .601   2.92 .05 161.43   .95 .46 .649   2.59 .04 154.54   .78 .38 .706   2.18 .04 124.79   
Gender -.13 -.86 .393 
 
.88 .66 1.18  -.16 -1.09 .276 
 
.85 .63 1.14  -.10 -.64 .524 
 
.91 .68 1.22  
Age .04 .72 .471   1.05 .93 1.18   .04 .64 .522   1.04 .92 1.18   .04 .58 .563   1.04 .92 1.17   
Event (E) .17 1.64 .101 
 
1.18 .97 1.44  .18 1.73 .084 
 
1.19 .98 1.45  .17 1.67 .095 
 
1.19 .97 1.45  
Outcome (O) .06 .63 .531   1.06 .88 1.29   .06 .55 .581   1.06 .87 1.28   .06 .60 .548   1.06 .87 1.29   
E  O -.19 -1.33 .185 
 
.83 .63 1.10  -.20 -1.38 .169 
 
.82 .62 1.09  -.19 -1.31 .189 
 
.83 .63 1.10  
Belief (B) .28 3.87 <.001 *** 1.32 1.15 1.53   1.15 2.99 .003 ** 3.16 1.49 6.71   .24 3.53 <.001 *** 1.27 1.11 1.44   
B  E .02 .31 .754 
 
1.03 .88 1.19  .05 .12 .905 
 
1.05 .48 2.32  .01 .14 .892 
 
1.01 .88 1.16  
B  O -.27 -3.62 <.001 *** .76 .66 .88   -1.38 -3.49 <.001 *** .25 .12 .55   -.25 -3.72 <.001 *** .78 .68 .89   
B  E  O .11 1.04 .296 
 
1.12 .91 1.38  .50 .87 .383 
 
1.64 .54 5.01  .08 .82 .415 
 
1.08 .89 1.31  
NFC -.29 -2.51 .012 * .75 .60 .94   -.30 -2.55 .011 * .74 .59 .93   -.30 -2.54 .011 * .74 .59 .94   
NFC  E .19 1.58 .113 
 
1.21 .96 1.52  .18 1.48 .138 
 
1.20 .94 1.51  .18 1.52 .128 
 
1.20 .95 1.52  
NFC   O .22 1.90 .058 a 1.25 .99 1.56   .21 1.76 .079 a 1.23 .98 1.55   .21 1.84 .067 a 1.24 .99 1.54   
NFC  E  O -.01 -.03 .976 
 
1.00 .72 1.38  .00 .00 .997 
 
1.00 .72 1.39  -.01 -.08 .936 
 
.99 .71 1.37  
FI .17 1.35 .178   1.19 .93 1.52   .24 1.90 .057 a 1.27 .99 1.62   .17 1.35 .177   1.19 .93 1.53   
FI  E -.21 -1.59 .111 
 
.81 .62 1.05  -.21 -1.57 .117 
 
.81 .63 1.05  -.21 -1.52 .128 
 
.81 .62 1.06  
FI  O -.09 -.69 .488   .91 .71 1.18   -.13 -1.45 .296   .88 .98 1.12   -.08 -.57 .567   .93 .72 1.20   
FI  E  O .15 .79 .431 
 
1.16 .80 1.68  .18 .96 .337 
 
1.19 .83 1.71  .16 .86 .391 
 
1.18 .81 1.71  
 
                                                
AR1 Diagonal‡ .92 39.59 <.001 *** -- .88 .97  .92 39.48 <.001 *** -- .88 .97  .92 39.55 <.001 *** -- .88 .97  
AR1 Rho‡ .04 2.31 .021 * -- .01 .08   .05 2.34 .019 * -- .01 .08   .05 2.45 .014 * -- .01 .08   
                         
†
 Figures for model with AR1 structure and random intercept; PK Beliefs subjected to natural logarithmic transformation; all continuous measures subjected to grand means centering; higher scores reflect female 
gender; inferential statistic for AR1 Rho (intraclass correlation coefficient) and AR1 Diagonal (estimated variance) is Z rather than t. Significant effects  at the *p<.05 **p<.01 and *** p<.001 level; a=approaches 
significance (two-tailed; n=3,478 to 3,494 cases) 
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Supplementary Table 1: GLMM Goodness-of-Fit Statistics for Conjunction Error 
Generation (Presence vs. Absence) by Covariance Structure & Paranormal Belief 
Types
† 
Covariance  ESP  PKLOG  LAD  
Structure  -2LL AIC  -2LL AIC  -2LL AIC  
           
Scaled Identity.  15,577.25 15,577.25   15,497.15 15,501.15   15,583.53 15,587.53  
Diagonal.  15,626.70 15,626.70  15,549.08 15,583.25  15,630.32 15,664.49  
First Order Auto-Regressive (AR1)  15,512.51 15,518.52   15,430.52 15,436.53   15,514.33 15,520.34  
Compound Symmetry (CS)  -- --   -- --   -- --  
           
† PK Beliefs subjected to natural logarithmic transformation; full models with random intercept and first order auto-regressive (AR1) covariance 
structures; model goodness-of-fit and complexity-corrected goodness-of-fit given by -2 Log Likelihood (-2LL) and Akaike’s Information Criteria (AIC) 
respectively; PK Beliefs subjected to natural logarithmic transformation; figures to 2 decimal places; smaller figures indicate better model fit; all 
compound symmetry structures failed to converge (FTC) (n=3,777 to 3,793 cases). 
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Supplementary Table 2: GLMM Goodness-of-Fit & -2LL Change Statistics for Conjunction Error Generation (Presence vs. Absence) 
by Paranormal Belief & Model Types
†
 
  Fit  ESP  PK  LAD  
Step Predictor(s) Entered Index  2 2 p   2 2 p   2 2 p   
                   
00. No intercept -2LL  16,024.12 -- --     16,024.12 -- --     16,024.12 -- --     
 
 AIC  16,028.22 -- -- 
  
16,028.22 -- -- 
  
16,028.22 -- --   
01. Fixed intercept only -2LL  16,146.00 121.88 <.001 ***   16,146.00 121.88 <.001 ***   16,146.00 121.88 <.001 ***   
 
 AIC  16,150.00 121.78 <.001 *** 
 
16,150.00 121.78 <.001 *** 
 
16,150.00 121.78 <.001 ***  
02. Random intercept only -2LL  16,851.22 705.22 <.001 ***   16,851.22 705.22 <.001 ***   16,851.22 705.22 <.001 ***   
 
 AIC  16,857.23 707.23 <.001 ***  16,857.23 707.23 <.001 *** 
 
16,857.23 707.23 <.001 ***  
03. Step 02 plus Gender -2LL  16,446.25 -404.97 <.001 ***   16,446.25 -404.97 <.001 ***   16,446.25 -404.97 <.001 ***   
 
 AIC  16,452.26 -404.97 <.001 *** 
 
16,452.26 -404.97 <.001 *** 
 
16,452.26 -404.97 <.001 ***  
04. Step 03 plus Age -2LL  15,184.69 -1,261.56 <.001 ***   15,184.69 -1,261.56 <.001 ***   15,184.69 -1,261.56 <.001 ***   
  AIC  15,190.70 -1,261.56 <.001 ***  15,190.70 -1,261.56 <.001 ***  15,190.70 -1,261.56 <.001 ***  
05. Step 04 plus Event -2LL  15,189.90 5.21 <.05 *   15,189.90 5.21 <.05 *   15,189.90 5.21 <.05 *   
  AIC  15,195.91 5.21 <.05 *  15,195.91 5.21 <.05 *  15,195.91 5.21 <.05 *  
06. Step 05 plus Outcome -2LL  15,194.35 4.45 <.05 *   15,194.35 4.45 <.05 *   15,194.35 4.45 <.05 *   
 
 AIC  15,200.36 4.45 <.05 * 
 
15,200.36 4.45 <.05 * 
 
15,200.36 4.45 <.05 *  
07. Step 06 plus Event  Outcome -2LL  15,199.10 4.75 <.05 *   15,199.10 4.75 <.05 *   15,199.10 4.75 <.05 *   
  AIC  15,205.10 4.74 <.05 *  15,205.10 4.74 <.05 *  15,205.10 4.74 <.05 *  
08. Step 07 plus Belief  -2LL  15,205.53 6.43 <.05 *   15,201.84 2.74 <.05 *   15,204.87 5.77 <.05 *   
  AIC  15,211.54 6.44 <.05 *  15,207.85 2.75 <.05 *  15,210.88 5.78 <.05 *  
09. Step 08 plus Belief  Event -2LL  15,209.61 4.08 <.05 *   15,202.44 .60 <.05 *   15,209.04 4.17 <.05 *   
  AIC  15,215.61 4.07 <.05 *  15,208.45 .60 <.05 *  15,215.05 4.17 <.05 *  
10. Step 09 plus Belief  Outcome -2LL  15,230.46 20.85 <.001 ***   15,219.67 17.23 <.001 ***   15,235.66 26.62 <.001 ***   
 
 AIC  15,236.46 20.85 <.001 ***  15,225.68 17.23 <.001 *** 
 
15,241.69 26.64 <.001 ***  
11 Step 10 plus Belief  Event  Outcome -2LL  15,234.58 4.12 <.05 *   15,219.76 .09 <.05 *   15,240.86 5.20 <.05 *   
 
 AIC  15,240.59 4.13 <.05 *  15,225.77 .09 <.05 * 
 
15,246.87 5.18 <.05 *  
12. Step 11 plus NFC -2LL  15,054.22 -180.36 <.001 ***   15,039.57 -180.19 <.001 ***   15,060.01 -180.85 <.001 ***   
 
 AIC  15,060.23 -180.36 <.001 *** 
 
15,045.58 -180.19 <.001 *** 
 
15,066.01 -180.86 <.001 ***  
13. Step 12 plus NFC  Event -2LL  15,062.05 7.83 .001 **   15,047.97 8.40 .001 **   15,067.30 7.29 .001 **   
 
 AIC  15,068.06 7.83 .001 **  15,053.98 8.40 .001 ** 
 
15,073.31 7.30 .001 **  
14. Step 13 plus NFC  Outcome -2LL  15,071.82 9.77 .001 **   15,054.73 6.76 .001 **   15,077.57 10.27 .001 **   
 
 AIC  15,077.83 9.77 .001 ** 
 
15,060.74 6.76 .001 ** 
 
15,083.58 10.27 .001 **  
15. Step 14 plus NFC  Event  Outcome -2LL  15,073.30 1.48 >.05     15,056.17 1.44 >.05     15,079.05 1.48 >.05     
  AIC  15,079.30 1.47 >.05   15,062.18 1.44 >.05   15,085.05 1.47 >.05   
                   
† PKLOG denotes PK Beliefs subjected to natural logarithmic transformation; all models with first order auto-regressive (AR1) structures; model goodness-of-fit and complexity-corrected goodness-of-fit given by -2 Log Likelihood 
(-2LL) and Akaike’s Information Criteria (AIC) respectively; 2df =1; PK Beliefs subjected to natural logarithmic transformation; figures to 2 decimal places; sig. change at the *p<.01 ** p<.01 and ***p<.001 levels; term ~<.05a 
= approached significance (two-tailed; n=3,777 to 3,793 cases). 
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Supplementary Table 2: GLMM Goodness-of-Fit & -2LL Change Statistics for Conjunction Error Generation (Presence vs. Absence) 
by Paranormal Belief & Model Types (continued)
†
 
  Fit  ESP  PK  LAD  
Step Predictor(s) Entered Index  2 2 p   2 2 p   2 2 p   
                   
16. Step 15 plus FI  -2LL  15,079.37 6.07 <.05 *   15,062.02 5.85 <.05 *   15,085.16 6.11 <.05 *   
 
 AIC  15,085.39 6.09 <.05 * 
 
15,068.02 5.84 <.05 * 
 
15,091.17 6.12 <.05 *  
17. Step 16 plus FI  Event -2LL  15,087.10 7.73 .001 **   15,068.59 6.57 <.05 *   15,091.60 6.44 <.05 *   
 
 AIC  15,093.11 7.72 .001 ** 
 
15,074.59 6.57 <.05 * 
 
15,097.60 6.43 <.05 *  
18. Step 17 plus FI  Outcome -2LL  15,090.26 3.16 >.05 a   15,072.47 3.88 <.05 *   15,094.74 3.14 >.05 a   
  AIC  15,096.27 3.16 >.05 a  15,078.48 3.89 <.05 *  15,100.75 3.15 >.05 a  
19. Step 08 plus FI  Event  Outcome -2LL  15,093.44 3.18 >.05 a   15,076.13 3.66 >.05 a   15,097.57 2.83 >.05     
 
 AIC  15,099.45 3.18 >.05 a   15,082.14 3.66 >.05 a   15,103.57 2.82 >.05     
 
     
   
   
   
    
† PKLOG denotes PK Beliefs subjected to natural logarithmic transformation; all models with first order auto-regressive (AR1) structures; model goodness-of-fit and complexity-corrected goodness-of-fit given by -2 Log Likelihood 
(-2LL) and Akaike’s Information Criteria (AIC) respectively; 2df =1; PK Beliefs subjected to natural logarithmic transformation; figures to 2 decimal places; sig. change at the *p<.01 ** p<.01 and ***p<.001 levels; term ~<.05a 
= approached significance (two-tailed; n=3,777 to 3,793 cases). 
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Supplementary Table 3: GLMM Goodness-of-Fit & -2LL Change Statistics for Conjunction Error Generation (Presence vs. Absence) 
by Paranormal Belief & Intercept Types
† 
Step Intercept Type Fit  ESP  PK  LAD  
  Index  2 2 p   2 2 p   2 2 p   
                   
1 Fixed intercept -2LL  14,912.88         14,799.20         14,893.90         
 
 AIC  14,916.88  
   
14,803.20   
  
14,897.90     
2 Random intercept -2LL  15,512.51 599.63 <.001 ***   15,430.52 631.32 <.001 ***   15,514.33 620.43 <.001 ***   
 
 AIC  15,518.52 602.09 <.001 ***   15,436.53 633.33 <.001 ***   15,520.34 622.44 <.001 ***   
 
     
   
   
   
    
† PK Beliefs subjected to natural logarithmic transformation; all models with first order auto-regressive (AR1) covariance structures; model goodness-of-fit and complexity-corrected goodness-of-fit given by -2 Log Likelihood (-2LL) and 
Akaike’s Information Criteria (AIC) respectively; 2df =1; figures to 2 decimal places; smaller figures indicate better model fit. Significant. change at the *p<.01 ** p<.01 and ***p<.001 levels (two-tailed; n=3,777 to 3,793 cases).  
 
 
Running Head: PARANORMAL BELIEF, THINKING STYLE & CONFIRMATORY CONJUNCTION ERRORS 
50 
 
Supplementary Text 
Follow-up Analyses Incorporating Paranormal Belief x Thinking Style Interactions 
 
Following reviewer comments, follow-up GLMMs were performed to further test the 
impact individual differences in thinking style had on believers’ proneness to (confirmatory) 
conjunction errors. First, raw NFC and FI ratings were subjected to median split analysis and 
dichotomized into low verses high NFC (49.6% versus 50.4% respectively; median =4.32) 
and low verses high FI (49.8% versus 50.2% respectively; median=4.91). Then paranormal 
belief, dichotomized NFC and FI measures, outcome type and relevant interaction terms were 
entered as into each of three GLMMs - one each for ESP, (log transformed) PK and LAD 
beliefs - with, as before, respondent gender and age serving as potential covariates. Because 
event type had no significant main or interaction effects on CE rates in primary analyses, this 
variable was dropped. All other GLMM characteristics (e.g., use of grand mean centring 
inclusion of the random intercept term and AR1 covariance structure) were retained.  
Classification Accuracy 
As Supplementary Table 4 shows, classification accuracy rates for the three follow-up 
GLMMs differed only slightly from those reported in the main text. This time, the percentage 
of conjunction errors correctly classified by ESP based and PK based models fell by 0.1% 
whereas for the LAD based model it increased by 0.6%. Likewise, the percentage of non-
errors correctly classified in the ESP, PK and LAD based models fell by 0.1%, 0.4% and 
1.3% respectively. Finally, the classification accuracy for all responses dropped by 0.1%, 
0.3% and 0.6% respectively. In sum, inclusion of relevant belief  thinking style interactions 
(plus removal of the event type variable) had only minimal impact on the predictive accuracy 
of follow-up models. 
*** Supplementary Table 4 here *** 
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Predictors of Conjunction Error Generation 
  As Supplementary Table 5 shows, predictor coefficients for the three follow-up GLMMs 
were, for the most part, parallel to those reported in primary analyses. Noteworthy differences 
were as follows.  
First, the effect of NFC ratings dropped to just below statistical significance in the follow-
up PK model (p=.060). These remained significant in both ESP and LAD models.  
Second, NFC  outcome interactions switched from being a near-significant positive 
predictor to a (fully) significant but negative predictor of CE rates. This was the case for all 
three belief-based models. Relevant exp(b) coefficients indicate that with all other predictors 
averaged, the shift from low to high NFC (coded -1 and +1 respectively) combined with a 
shift from disconfirmatory to a confirmatory outcome raised the odds of CE generation by 
around .55. At first glance it seems individuals with a low NFC were 1/.55 or 1.82 times 
more likely to commit confirmatory CEs than those with high NFC. This is consistent with 
main analyses, with the change in sign of beta weights reflective of how the low verses high 
NFC dichotomy was coded (see Supplementary Figure 1). However, post hoc simple effects 
analyses - with  adjusted to .0125 - failed to confirm these differences (all p’s >.023; ns). 
*** Supplementary Figure 1 here *** 
Third, whilst no significant belief  NFC effects emerged in relation to ESP and PK, a 
near-significant LAD belief  NFC effect was found (p=.062). Associated exp(b) coefficients 
suggest that with all other predictors averaged, a shift from low to high NFC combined with a 
unit increase in LAD beliefs (marginally) increased the odds of CE generation by a ratio of 
.76. In other words, as level of LAD belief increased by one unit, believers high in NFC were 
1/.76 or 1.32 times less likely to make a CE than were LAD believers low in NFC. This time, 
post hoc tests – again with  adjusted to .0125 – confirmed that stronger LAD believers with 
low NFC were more likely to make CEs than were stronger LAD believers with high NFC, 
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b=.37; t=3.67; p<.001; exp(b)=1.41; CI95[1.17, 1.69]. This was further qualifies by a 
significant LAD belief  outcome type interaction in that stronger LAD believers with low 
NFC were more likely to make confirmatory CEs than corresponding LAD sceptics with high 
NFC, b=-.28; t=-3.88; p<.001; exp(b)=.75; CI95[.65, .78]. For LAD believers with low NFC, 
comparable effects for CEs generally (p=.027; ns) and for confirmatory CEs in particular 
(p=.030; ns) were not significant at the adjusted  level. To illustrate these effects, LAD 
beliefs were split low verses high categories (50.6% versus 49.4% respectively; 
median=4.02) and combined with low verses high NFC to make four LAD x NFC 
classifications. CE rates for these four classifications across confirmatory verses 
disconfirmatory outcome types are presented in Supplementary Figure 2. From this it would 
seem LAD sceptics who prefer to adopt a more rational-analytic (System 2) thinking style 
were less prone to a confirmatory conjunction fallacy than all other groups.  
*** Supplementary Figure 2 here *** 
Finally, minor variation was also found in the main effect of FI which was now non-
significant in the PK as well as ESP and LAD models. All other main and interaction effects 
involving FI were non-significant with no other changes (relative to main analyses) 
emerging.  
In sum, follow-up analyses suggest the impact stronger paranormal belief had on CE 
generation depended, to some extent, on the strength of respondents’ preference for rational-
analytic but not intuitive-experiential thinking. Surprisingly, this was only true for LAD 
believers; those who prefer to shun rational-analytic (System 2) thinking made more 
confirmatory CEs than LAD believers’ more inclined to employ logical reasoning. In other 
words, having a higher need for cognition results in fewer confirmatory CEs for those 
relatively sceptical of life after death but not for individuals endorsing the veracity of afterlife 
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claims. But as previously suggested, this single effect is likely to be a statistical artefact 
particularly when considered in the context of other cross-belief type trends.
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Supplementary Table 4: Percentage of Conjunction Errors, Non-Errors & All 
Responses Correctly Predicted by Paranormal Belief & Intercept Types: Follow-Up 
Analyses† 
Response Intercept  ESP  PK  LAD  
Type Type  (%)  (%)  (%)  
  
 
 
   
 
 
Errors Fixed  18.4  20.7  22.6  
 
Random  58.1  57.6  58.9  
  
 
 
   
 
 
Non-errors Fixed  88.5  87.1  85.9  
 
Random  79.9  80.4  79.7  
  
 
 
   
 
 
All Fixed  58.8  59.1  59.1  
 
Random  70.7  70.8  70.9  
 
 
 
   
 
 
† PK Beliefs subjected to natural logarithmic transformation; models with first order auto-regressive (AR1) covariance structure; thinking 
styles dichotomised into low verses high NFC (49.6% versus 50.4%) and low verses high FI (49.8% versus 50.2) via media split analysis; 
figures to one decimal place (n=3,362 to 3,378 cases). 
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Supplementary Table 5: Predictors of Conjunction Error Generation (Presence vs. Absence) by Paranormal Belief Type: Follow-Up 
Analyses† 
 
ESP  PK  LAD  
 
   
  
95% CI    
   
95% CI   
    
95% CI  
Predictor b t P 
 
exp(b) Lwr Upr  b t p 
 
exp(b) Lwr Upr  b t p 
 
exp(b) Lwr Upr  
 
   
    
   
    
   
    
   
Random Intercept .86 .42 .674 
 
2.37 .04 131.26  .93 .45 .654 
 
2.53 .04 146.65  .94 .45 .651 
 
2.56 .04 149.21  
Gender -.04 -.26 .796 
 
.96 .71 1.30  -.09 -.59 .559 
 
.91 .67 1.24  -.03 -.19 .848 
 
.97 .72 1.32  
Age .04 .68 .497 
 
1.04 .93 1.18  .04 .64 .523 
 
1.04 .92 1.17  .04 .67 .503 
 
1.04 .92 1.18  
Outcome (O) .29 2.06 .040 * 1.33 1.01 1.75  .20 1.48 .138 
 
1.22 .94 1.60  .23 1.67 .096 
 
1.25 .96 1.64  
Belief (B) .45 4.29 <.001 *** 1.57 1.28 1.94  1.96 3.32 .001 ** 7.12 2.23 22.74  .34 3.73 <.001 *** 1.40 1.17 1.69  
B  O -.03 -3.50 <.001 *** .73 .62 .87  -1.52 -3.08 .002 ** .22 .08 .58  -.28 -3.77 <.001 *** .76 .65 .87  
NFC .54 2.13 .033 * 1.71 1.04 2.81  .48 1.88 .060 a 1.61 .98 2.64  .57 2.21 .027 * 1.78 1.07 2.95  
NFC  O -.64 -3.04 .002 ** .53 .35 .80  -.57 -2.74 .006 ** .57 .38 .85  -.60 -2.82 .005 ** .55 .36 .83  
NFC  B -.21 -1.32 .188 
 
.81 .59 1.11  -1.11 -1.25 .213 
 
.33 .09 1.89  -.28 -1.87 .062 a .76 .57 1.01  
NFC  B  O .00 .01 .992 
 
1.00 .77 1.31  -.06 -.08 .940 
 
.95 .22 4.01  .06 .49 .628 
 
1.06 .83 1.35  
FI .03 .13 .896 
 
1.03 .63 1.69  -.04 -.13 .894 
 
.97 .58 1.61  -.03 -.11 .916 
 
.97 .59 1.60  
FI  O -.13 -.60 .3550 
 
.88 .58 1.34  -.06 -.26 .798 
 
.95 .62 1.45  -.07 -.32 .749 
 
.94 .62 1.41  
FI  B -.13 -.80 .424 
 
.88 .64 1.21  -.11 -.12 .909 
 
.90 .14 5.94  .00 .03 .977 
 
1.00 .75 1.36  
FI  B  O .23 1.61 .107 
 
1.25 .95 1.65  1.01 1.26 .207 
 
2.75 .57 13.27  .20 1.55 .121 
 
1.22 .95 1.57  
NFC x FI -.30 -.86 .392 
 
.74 .37 1.48  -.30 -.80 .423 
 
.75 .36 1.53  -.36 -1.01 .314 
 
.70 .34 1.41  
NFC x FI x O .38 1.27 .205 
 
1.46 .81 2.61  .34 1.13 .261 
 
1.41 .78 2.54  .34 1.14 .253 
 
1.41 .78 2.54  
NFC FI  B -.06 -.27 .791 
 
.94 .58 1.51  -.75 -.56 .578 
 
.47 .03 6.61  .11 .47 .638 
 
1.11 .72 1.73  
NFC  FI  B  O .04 .21 .835 
 
1.04 .70 1.56  .10 .09 .927 
 
1.11 .12 9.97  -13 -.69 .490 
 
.88 .61 1.27  
 
   
   
    
   
    
   
    
AR1 Diagonal‡ .92 38.91 <.001 *** -- .88 .97  .92 38.82 <.001 *** -- .88 .97  .92 38.89 <.001 *** -- .88 .97  
AR1 Rho‡ .05 2.54 .011 * -- .01 .09  .05 2.50 .012 * -- .01 .09  .05 2.61 .009 * -- .01 .09  
                         
† Figures for model with AR1 structure and random intercept; PK Beliefs subjected to natural logarithmic transformation; all continuous measures subjected to grand mean centring; models with first order auto-
regressive (AR1) covariance structure; thinking styles dichotomised into low verses high NFC (49.6% versus 50.4%) and low verses high FI (49.8% versus 50.2) via media split analysis; higher scores reflect more 
NFC, more FI and female gender; inferential statistic for AR1 Rho (intraclass correlation coefficient) and AR1 Diagonal (estimated variance) is Z rather than t. Significant effects  at the *p<.05 **p<.01 and *** p<.001 
level; a=approaches significance (two-tailed; n=3,362 to 3,378 cases) 
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Supplementary Figure 1: Conjunction Error Rate across Low versus High NFC by Outcome 
Type (with 95% Confidence Intervals) 
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Supplementary Figure 2: Conjunction Error Rate across Four LAD  NFC Categories by 
Outcome Type (with 95% Confidence Intervals) 
 
 
 
 
